ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Ad-hoc network is decentralized and dynamic in nature. To establish communication between two nodes in ad-hoc network, on-demand routing protocols are very popular in use. On-demand routing mechanism is victimised by various types of attacks during route discovery process. Rushing attack is such a vulnerable attack. This research aims to isolate the rushing attacker in on-demand routing protocol, AODV for Ad-hoc network.
In AODV, whenever source requires a communication with a destination, source initiates route discovery process by broadcasting route request packet (RREQ) to establish a communication route to that destination. Intermediate nodes or routers pass RREQ until the destination is found. Destination or intermediate node which has valid route to destination replies with RREP just after receiving of RREQ. To limit the overhead of RREQ flooding, every intermediate node only forward the 1 st received routing packets (RREQ/RREP) and discards all late received identical routing packets. Rushing attacker takes the advantage of this mechanism. Rushing attacker forwards rushed routing packets to target node more quickly than legitimate nodes. As a result, target or victimized node only considers the 1 st received rushed routing packet for route discovery and discards all late arrived legitimate routing packets. In this way rushing attacker includes itself in discovered route and attracts all the data to exploit.
Rushing attacker sends rushed routing packets either by ignoring MAC/routing layer delay or by using higher transmission range. We have incorporated the trust concept to isolate rushing attacker from discovered route in AODV. We have introduced a new model i.e. Trusted Ondemand Routing (TOR) model and based on this TOR model we have proposed CAT-AODV-R (Context Aware Trusted AODV against Rushing attack). Trust is belief or trust level between trustor and trustee. Trustor (CT) is the believing entity which evaluates the trust level for trustee (TE) on the basis of context dependent trust computation. The final trust computation is dependent on direct and indirect trust under timing constraint. Direct trust is evaluated on the basis of context based expectations and misbehaviour identification. On the other hand, indirect trust is evaluated depending on recommendations and notifications. If CT evaluated Trust level for TE is not up to the threshold limit, CT does not consider TE in route discovery process by discarding malicious TE forwarded routing packet.
In the section 2, the status of the considered domain is presented and the rushing attack is discussed in section 3. In section 4, TOR model architecture is explained. In section 5, functionalities of CAT-AODV-R are discussed on the basis of trust computation of underlying TOR model. Simulation results of our experiments are presented in section 6. Section 7 includes the conclusion part.
RELATED WORK
Trust becomes a popular approach to provide security in a distributed way for ad-hoc networks. Trust concept is proposed in different ways and in different aspects. In [7] , a trust monitoring architecture called TrAM (Trust Architecture for Monitoring), monitors trustworthiness of service users at run-time depending on trust rules and calculation mechanism for preventing occurrences of unwanted events. A system [4] , based on path reputation and trust value, is proposed to enhances network throughput and reliability of discovered route. Here, trust value is incremented and decremented according to positive and negative observations, respectively. An integrated trust management model [8] is introduced to select trustworthy service by quantification of trust on platform of context-aware service. This model, addresses a basic set of trust aspects related to identity provisioning, privacy enforcement, and context provisioning activities.
Using trust concept AODV is secured by many proposed approaches. Trust-based SAODV [3] is proposed on the basis of intrusion detection mechanism (IDM) and trust-based mechanism (TBM) to penalize selfish nodes in AODV. In [1] , a modified version of AODV is proposed on the basis of node trust and route trust to secure AODV. This work supports continuous node performance evaluation and neighbour node's recommendations collection. In [6] , implicit trust relations between nodes are used to differentiate between trustworthy nodes from malicious nodes in AODV. Here, implicit trust relations of the AODV are formalized. Based on these relations, each node is able to reason on the actions performed by its neighbours and deduces information about their knowledge. Finally, deduced information is used to supervise the behaviour of neighbour and to detect malicious nodes. In [5] , a trust-based framework is proposed for improving security and robustness of AODV. This mechanism is based on incentives and penalties depending on the behaviour of network nodes.
RUSHING ATTACK IN AODV
AODV routing protocol only considers the 1 st received routing packets for route discovery. Rushing attacker sends rushed routing packets ( RREQ or RREP) more quickly to target node in comparison to other legitimate sender node. Rushing attackers send rushed routing packets more quickly by ignoring MAC layer and/or routing layer delay, or by using higher transmission range.
In Figure 1 (a) , node R 1 is rushing attacker which sends rushed RREQ more quickly to target node 3, in comparison to node 2, by ignoring delays. Node 3 discards late received node 2 forwarded legitimate RREQ and forwards the first received R 1 forwarded rushed RREQ to destination D. Consequently, D replies with RREP towards source via R 1 . As a result, source forwards all data packets towards R 1 . Figure 1 (b), node R 1 is rushing attacker which sends rushed RREP more quickly to target node 1, in comparison to node 2, by ignoring delays. Node 1 discards late received node 2 forwarded legitimate RREP and forwards the first received R 1 forwarded rushed RREP to destination S. As a result, S forwards all data towards R 1 and R 1 exploits those data.
Another type of rushing attacker sends rushed routing packets to target node using higher transmission range. Here the higher transmission range is at least twice the normal transmission range. In Figure 2 (a), node R 2 is rushing attacker which sends rushed RREQ to target node 4 more quickly in comparison to node2. Node 4 discards late received legitimate RREQ that reached form node 2 via node 3 and forwards the first received R 2 forwarded rushed RREQ to destination D. Consequently, D replies with RREP towards source via R 2 . Since, R 2 is using higher transmission range, the wireless link between node 4 and R 2 is not bidirectional link. When D forwarded RREP reaches node 4, it can not be forwarded to R 2 because of shorter transmission range of node 4. As a result, node S can not get RREP and no route will be discovered between S and D. Figure 2 (b), node R 2 is rushing attacker which sends rushed RREP using higher transmission range. R 2 sends rushed RREP to target node 1 more quickly in comparison to node3. Node 1 discards late received legitimate RREP that reached form node 3 via node 2 and forwards the first received R 2 forwarded rushed RREP to source S. Consequently, S sends all data to R 2 towards D. Since, R 2 is using higher transmission range, the wireless link between R 2 and node 1 is not bidirectional link. When S forwarded RREP reaches node 1, it can not be forwarded to R 2 since of shorter transmission range of node 1. As a result, node D can not get any data from S.
TOR MODEL
In this work, AODV is extended with TOR model to establish secure routing path between source and destination by avoiding malicious nodes. The following section describes the structural and functional components of the model. TOR model ( Figure 3 ) consists of three functional modules (Node Manager, Trust Module and Decision Manager) along with the on-demand routing protocol, AODV. 
Node Manager
On receipt of AODV specified RREQ, RREP and TSB_Events, CT's Node Manager sends TC_Events to Trust Module for computing trust value for TE. On the other hand, based on received decision (based on trust value) from Decision Manager, Node Manager either considers TE in the route discovery (case of belief decision) or avoids TE (case of disbelief decision). It also broadcasts the computed final trust value as notification to other nodes. When a node receives this notification, it sends the value to Trust Module for storing in Final Trust Repository. When CT requires recommendation about TE, Node Manager of recommender sends recommendation to CT's Node Manager. 
Trust Module

Decision Manager
On the basis of received trust value from Trust Module, Decision Manager takes either belief or disbelief decision for TE. If the computed trust value is greater than 0.5, it takes belief decision otherwise it takes disbelief decisio. It sends this decision to Node Manager for considering or not considering TE in route discovery. It also forwards the received final trust value to Node Manager for notifying other nodes in the network.
CAT-AODV-R (CONTEXT AWARE TRUSTED AODV AGAINST RUSHING ATTACK)
In CAT-AODV-R, context (C) is classified into context-1 and context-2, and on these considered contexts two types of misbehaviours (misbehaviour-1, misbehaviour-2) of rushing attacker is defined.
Context-1 (C1): C1 is defined with respect to ignorance of routing layer delay and/or MAC layer delay.
Context-2 (C2): C2 is defined with respect to usage of higher transmission range of a node in comparison to other nodes of the network.
Misbehaviour-1 (M1): Based on C1, if a particular node sends rushed RREQ packets by ignoring MAC and/or routing layer delays, this behaviour is considered as M1.
Misbehaviour-2 (M2): Based on C2, if a particular node sends rushed RREQ by using higher transmission range, this behaviour is considered as M2.
In CAT-AODV-R, every node broadcasts RQres packet (response packet of RREQ). In Figure 5 , when TE receives RREQ, it broadcasts RQres and after receiving it, CT considers RQres receiving time for direct evaluation of TE. After necessary processing TE broadcasts RREQ and after receiving it, CT considers RREQ receiving time for direct evaluation. Next, CT broadcasts RQres in response of received RREQ. Against RQres, TS_Events are collected for direct trust evaluation, and also recommendations are collected for indirect trust evaluation. • T Pi : Processing time, where i = 1, 2,…. different levels of processing.
• T Const-j : Different constant times for network. Where j = 1,2,… .
In this work, CT evaluates final trust of TE depending on different level of trusts. Interdependencies among trust levels are shown in Figure 6 . CAT-AODV-R computes trust in phases. These are concerned with initiation, computation, decision and reaction phases. Phase-1 is for initiating Direct and Indirect Trust Manager to compute final direct trust and final indirect trust respectively. Considering phase-2, phase-3 and phase-4, final direct and indirect trust is computed in phase-5. In phase-6, current trust is computed by Trust Engine depending on final direct and indirect trust. Based on current trust and collaborative old self evaluated final trust, Trust Engine computes the final trust in this phase. Finally, on the basis of computed final trust, belief or disbelief decision is taken for TE in phase-7. Based on belief-disbelief decision, CAT-AODV-R avoids rushing attacker, and secures the route discovery.
Phase-1: Initiating Direct and Indirect Trust Manager
After receiving RREQ, TE broadcasts RQres and CT receives this RQres at time T 1 (TE 
Phase-2: [ CT T C1 TE ]t cur D and [ CT T C TE ]t old N Computation
After receiving initial TC_Events (T 1 (TE) and T 2 (TE)) from Trust Engine, CT's Direct Trust Manager calculates T(TE). Here, TE = ( T 2 (TE) -T 1 (TE) ). Direct Trust Manager compares T(TE
Proof: Here, T(TE) = ( T 2 (TE) -T 1 (TE) ) = (T RREQ + T P1 + T Const-1 ). For T(TE)
, the time T RREQ is concerned with TE forwarded RREQ to CT. If T(TE) < α, it implies that T RREQ is taking less time than standard time, specified for legitimate TE forwarded legitimate RREQ to CT, since T P1 and T Const-1 are constant for the considered network. It implies that, TE is forwarding rushed RREQ to CT by ignoring MAC and/or routing layer delays. (2). Here e -(told-t0) is time decaying function, where t 0 is initial time and t old is the old specified time at which received notified trust value is computed. If CT believes TE and broadcasts TE forwarded RREQ, CT appends the IP address of TE in RREQ. Only the IP address of current TE is maintained in RREQ. If CT discards a TE forwarded RREQ, CT stores a tag which indicates TE as malicious RREQ sender. If later a RREQ of same route discovery reaches to that CT with appended IP address of CT evaluated malicious TE, CT discard that RREQ immediately.
When destination node receives RREQ, it evaluates the trust of the RREQ sender node (destination is CT and RREQ sender node is TE) by the same process.
SIMULATION RESULT
We conducted simulation experiments to evaluate the performance of the proposed routing algorithm CAT-AODV-R, in presence of rushing attack which behaves according to Misbehavior-1 (M1) or Misbehavior-2 (M2). Our CAT-AODV-R is also compared with existing routing algorithm, AODV. The traffic type is CBR. Here considered network is over a 1000m×1000m terrain. Presented results are evaluated with 100 simulation runs. Figure 7 shows that CAT-AODV-R detects rushing attacker efficiently as the detection rate is efficient, with respect to network of 100 nodes. Detection rate denotes the rate of detection of rushing attacker among total rushing attackers present in the network. We have considered the positions of rushing attackers at near source, near destination and anywhere. In Figure 9 , we have considered the positions of rushing attackers at near source; in Figure 10 , the positions of rushing attackers at near destination and in Figure 11 , the positions of rushing attackers at anywhere. From Figure 9 , Figure 10 and Figure 11 we can see that rushing attackers can not get success in our CAT-AODV-R where as AODV is highly victimised in presence of rushing attackers. Attack success rate denotes the number(s) of discovered route included rushing attacker(s) with respect to the attacker free legitimate discovered route. Here the considered network is of 50 nodes. 
CONCLUSIONS
CAT-AODV-R protocol for ad hoc network has been presented. We proposed a new solution using trust concept, against the rushing attack problem for existing on demand routing protocol AODV, in ad hoc networks. With the help of proposed trust model, all CAT-AODV-R supported nodes cooperate together to detect and avoid misbehavior-1 (M1) or misbehavior-2 (M2) behaving rushing attacker nodes in a more reliable fashion. Our detection-avoidance scheme detects the misbehaving rushing attacker nodes and isolates them from the active data forwarding and routing on the basis of belief-disbelief decision which comes from evaluated trust value. More research into this novel mechanism for secure routing is necessary. For further research, we will work on improving the proposed trust model, which may provide a solution to other attacks in ad-hoc network.
